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Referee decision making is an emblematic example of 
complex cognition. We study it as it occurs during rugby 
matches. Using a head-mounted video, we help the referee 
during an interview to articulate what makes sense. This 
allows proposing an alternative perspective to classic 
decision making theory to describe referee activity. 
Keywords
Perception/action coupling, head mounted video recording, 
naturalistic approach, intuitive judgment, rugby referee 
cognition. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Referee decision making is an emblematic example of 
complex cognition occurring in real-world context; this 
context has all the characteristics of the environment in 
which the NDM movement is interested in (Kahneman & 
Klein, 2009; Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). A referee has to 
cope with ill-structured problems, uncertain dynamic 
environments, ill-defined and competing goals, shifting 
conditions, time pressure, high stakes, multiple players and 
organizational constraints. So, refereeing is a case of NDM 
(Mascarenhas, Collins, Mortimer, & Morris, 2005), but it 
seems to be an extreme case for different reasons, some 
evoked by Mascarenhas et al., and others at least as much 
important:  
(1) the referee makes decisions under intense scrutiny; 
(2) referee physical demands are intensive; 
(3) referee decision making occurs in an antagonistic 
environment –teams confront each others in order to win a 
match–: what is right for one team would be wrong for the 
other and players provide irrelevant cues such as feigning;  
(4) the referee has to react instantaneously: if he/she 
doesn’t, it would be too late as play keeps running; 
(5) it is difficult to identify a decision moment for two 
reasons: first, not all decisions are visible, second, overall 
referee activity is deciding; 
(6) the referee is not called upon to solve a problem or to 
cope with a prior and external event, he/she participates in 
the event content to be assessed. 
Although NDM provides a relevant frame in order to study 
referee decision making, very few studies are involved into 
this movement (Mascarenhas, Button, O'Hare, & Dicks, 
2009; Mascarenhas, et al., 2005). Most researches focus on 
heuristics and biases: visual input distorted perception, 
influence of uniforms’ color or stereotypes, reputation bias, 
home bias, sequential effect (Mascarenhas, O'Hare, & 
Plessner, 2006; Plessner & Haar, 2006)… However, some 
research studies try to take into account the complexity of 
referee activity. Plessner et al. (2009) highlight that 
refereeing studies suppose embodied cognition perspective 
and focus on referee‘s ability to make decisions by 
assessing multiple features of the situation. In this way, 
what is usually considered as bias –for example crowd 
noise– could be used as an additional cue. The NDM 
movement radicalizes this orientation: “members of NDM 
community have an aversion to the word bias” (Kahneman 
& Klein, 2009, p 525) and do not compare human 
judgments between algorithm outcomes. They describe 
expert performance: “how people actually make decisions 
in real-world setting” (Klein, 2008, p456). In this way, 
there is a shift in the perspective to study refereeing: 
Referees do not only apply the rules; their judgments are 
active decision making processings; they have to sell the 
resulting decision to the players; they account for the 
context of the game (Mascarenhas, et al., 2009; 
Mascarenhas, Collins, & Mortimer, 2002; Mascarenhas, et 
al., 2005; Mascarenhas, et al., 2006). 
Although research on referee performance should consider 
a naturalistic environment (Mascarenhas, et al., 2002), most 
of the investigations fail for two main reasons. Firstly, even 
if there isn’t solely a reference to an application of the rules 
to a reality, the methodology is still normative: referee 
decision making processing is always evaluated according 
to judgment accuracy (Mascarenhas, et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the research does not focus on referee decision 
making as it occurs, but refers to what it should be. 
Secondly, methodological procedures are based on decision 
making tasks about critical incidents in which referees have 
to decide if there is a foul or not and to award an 
appropriate sanction. These incidents are presented in brief 
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video sequences (few seconds) which already circumscribe 
particular events. Thus, the situation which has to be 
judged is a priori defined in time, space and perspective. 
The referee's attention is already focused on an event, 
while on the pitch - rather than with a succession or 
sequence of events - he has to cope with the game's 
continuous play. Consequently, part of the complexity of 
referee cognition is perhaps to construct what has to be 
judged. After all, as Mascarenhas does -but for different 
reasons from ours- (Mascarenhas, et al., 2006), we can say 
that referee cognition in real-world context has not ever 
been described. 
2. PROPOSITION TO STUDY REFEREE 
COGNITION IN REAL-WORLD CONTEXT 
Our purpose is precisely to study rugby referee cognition as 
it occurs. Like Klein (2008, p456), we conduct field 
research “to find out how people were able to make tough 
decisions” in their own real-world context. Refereeing 
should not be considered as a cold mental process, but as a 
complex practice. As firefighters who “saw themselves as 
acting and reacting” (Klein, 1993, p 139), referees do not 
only judge but act on the pitch. In order to understand what 
a referee really does during a match, we propose a novel 
perspective which does not distinguish acts from 
judgments. This perspective highlights perception-action 
coupling (Gibson, 1977). What makes instantaneously 
sense for the actor in situation depends on certain 
orientations in which cognitive, affective, motor spheres 
are inextricably linked (Canguilhem, 2008; Récopé, Lièvre, 
& Rix-Lièvre, 2010). Therefore, action and perceptive 
knowing cannot be separate: acts are embodied and 
spontaneous meanings (Merleau-Ponty, 1942). Like Klein, 
we consider that expert decision-making is based on tacit 
knowledge (Kahneman & Klein, 2009); we propose that it 
is as much a perceptive as an acting knowledge. In a 
pragmatic perspective, we have no more hypotheses on 
referee cognition, but start from what referee cognition and 
action produce. According to different propositions 
concerning a judge’s activity (Perelman, 1990; Ricoeur, 
1995), we focus on judgment acts which are defined as 
bodily or linguistic manifestations which show to players 
and impose upon them what is possible and conversely 
what is unacceptable during a match. Therefore, our 
purpose is to study what and how players’ activities are 
making sense for the referee in order to understand what 
and how he shows something and imposes it. 
In order to study how he spontaneously constructs, shows 
and imposes what is possible, three main points have to be 
taken into account. Firstly, as what makes sense is for the 
most part implicit, we have to help the referee to articulate 
it. Although, “the power the subject has to set sights on 
himself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1988, p408) establishes the 
possibilities the actor has to explicate his experience, the 
actor is not spontaneously able to bring it to light. “If the 
subject wants to be able to produce a description he first 
has to presentify the lived experience […] to suspend his 
usual way of doing things in order that what previously 
only existed “in act” now appears as object” (Vermersch, 
1999, p36). If any actor is capable of reflection, it is not a 
position that is spontaneously adopted towards his/her own 
action; it must be encouraged by a method. This 
presupposes that each referee must be assisted in rendering 
explicit what makes sense for him during the course of the 
match. Secondly, the  activity of a referee is a public one. It 
is impossible, therefore, to ask him about what is making 
sense during the match: we have to wait to the end. In this 
way, some methodologies use video “to assist the subject to 
recall important mental events” (Omodei & McLennan, 
1994, p1412). During an interview, video recording allows 
the actor to relate to a particular lived-experience and to 
invite him to render explicit what is making sense for him 
throughout. It is important because practice and its 
knowledge are embedded in context. Thirdly, video is 
usually used by referees for auto-appraisings or external 
evaluations. Therefore, when watching the video, most of 
their discourse is about justification: they watch the match 
as a spectator or a supervisor. In order to overcome this 
problem, we propose like Omodei & McLennan (1994), 
another kind of video recording, a perspective closest to the 
referee’s one during the match. Using this perspective 
during a video-stimulated recall enables “the subject to 
become psychologically re-immersed in the orignal 
situation” (Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan, 1997, p142). 
In order to distinguish this kind of self-confrontation 
interviews, we called it subjective re situ interviews (Rix-
Lièvre, 2010; Rix & Biache, 2004; Rix & Lièvre, 2008). 
3. METHOD
We have worked with seven experienced rugby referees. 
The investigations took place during official matches of 
French “Federal 1”, a semi-professional Rugby 
championship (third French high-level Championship).  
For each investigation, 
(1) the match was filmed from the stands,  
(2) the referee was eqquipped with a head-mounted camera 
to record a perspective close to his own subjective one in 
the situation (see Figure 1); this perspective was audio and 
video-recorded all along the match, 
Figure 1: Perspective recorded  
by referee head-mounted camera 
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(3) after the match, a subjective re situ interview was 
realised in which the referee was asked to describe his 
activity, to tell the researcher what was important for him 
during his action. In doing this, we used the head-mounted 
video from the beginning of the match to foster “an 
experiential immersion” (Omodei, et al., 1997, p 142); 
there isn’t any sequence which points to a particular event 
but the aim is to return to what was salient for the referee 
all along the match. 
Observational data and the referee’s verbalisations were 
then examined together in order to relate judgment act 
processings with both subjective and objective approaches. 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
These investigations have produced data enabling the 
researcher to understand the cognitive dimensions of 
referee’s activity as it occurs in situ. From this material, 
three kinds of judgment acts were distinguished (Rix, 
2005): act-judgment, fact-judgment, deliberate judgment. 
These are three different relations between the referee and 
the players’ actions, three manners to construct, to show, to 
impose what is possible and conversely what is 
unacceptable, and three kinds of ‘things’ imposed. A fact-
judgment instantaneously shows a precise point of context 
in its relation to a rule, which appears perceptually evident. 
“Knock-on” tells the referee; he explicates ex post during 
the interview that there is knock-on, it is a pity, it was a 
good action, but there is knock-on. Fact and rule exist at the 
same time for the referee during the match. An act-
judgment is a judicatory moment insofar as it builds itself 
progressively in the referee’s dynamic relation to the 
players’ acts. What the referee imposes does not exist 
autonomously in the game context, but results from referee 
and player interaction throughout a game moment. Referee, 
for example, tells one player “Move back, move back, 
move back”, the player doesn’t, the referee whistles and 
says: “I tell you, three times”. There is an offside position 
but it is not referred to as a fact, but to players activities 
flux. In these two cases, there isn’t any alternative 
evaluation, nor mental simulation: the referee hasn’t 
enough time to imagine the accuracy of his judgment act. 
These judgment acts are “intuitive judgment” (Kahneman 
& Klein, 2009, p519): there are spontaneous acts; what is 
imposed is necessary or evident for the referee. Unlike act-
judgment and fact-judgment, the referee develops 
deliberate judgment when the game is stopped. In 
problematic contexts, the referee takes time to examine the 
events with more information. After a scrum, a little 
fighting begins but the referee had followed the ball; he 
perceives a problem and stops the play in order to ask his 
assistants what happens. His judgment act results, in this 
case, in the conscious reconstruction of a finished event. 
This decision making processing is close to the one 
describe by Pennington and Hastie: like a juror, the referee 
construts “a coherent story of what apparently has 
happened” (Lipshitz, 1993, p110). 
The research assumes there is not only one recognition 
processing. Indeed, three kinds emerge, each corresponding 
to a kind of judgment act. The referee situation is 
constructed: 
- instaneously during continuing play as a precise fact 
which appears as a shared evidence; 
- throughtout player activities flux during continuing play , 
as a necessity according to what is possible and conversely 
what is unacceptable for the referee; 
- as a critical event whose logic is reconstructed ex post 
Although this research informs what is recognized by the 
referee, it mainly highlights the way in which the referee 
constructs his own situation.  
Even if we distinguish different judgment acts, they have 
some generic characteristics. These are neither passive 
reactions to an environmental configuration, nor a decision- 
tree framework. Every judgment act is descriptive and 
performative: descriptive insofar as a game moment is 
displayed in a particular manner; performative insofar as 
what he decribes happens. Consequently, his description 
gives a direction to the game. Thus, every judgment act has 
several relations to game rules which is not a simple 
application. The referee’s activity could not still be 
considered as passive rule application to a peculiar context, 
but the referee co-constructs, with players, the match’s 
course, and the rules of the game establish this possibility. 
Studying referee decision making activity in a real 
environment shows (1) it’s impossible to conceptually 
dissociate foul judgment from control of the game 
procedures; (2) referee NDM is not just decision 
processing, but an interactive activity. 
Therefore, to understand referee cognition activity, the 
research in refereeing NDM has to focus on designing 
dynamic descriptive concepts which include together these 
different dimensions, as “judgment acts” do. But we have 
to notice that the referee’s NDM is not only characterized 
by judgment acts which are bodily observable displays. 
Indeed, as Helsen & Bultynck (2004) highlight, numerous 
referee decisions are non-observable. So, in order to study 
referee’s NDM, future research will also have to investigate 
the referee’s non-observable judgment activity. 
5. CONCLUSION 
However, our research allows us to suggest some directions 
to referee training programs. Firstly, using head-mounted 
video recording during an ex post interview is a powerful 
tool of experience recall (Omodei, McLennan, 1994; 
Omodei, et al., 1997; Omodei, McLennan & Whitford 
1998). Most of referees who have participated to this 
research highlight that the re situ subjective interview 
arouses reflective learning. Therefore, the methodology 
developped could be a first stage of a coaching method. 
Secondly, training programs have to be worked out in order 
to enhance referee deliberate practice (Mascarenhas, et al., 
2005). The most important seems to train referees to 
construct what has to be imposed. For example, according 
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to his position, what makes sense for the referee is 
different, and the possiblity and the way to impose it, is 
also different. Consequently, training programs should 
propose to the referee not only to judge, but especially to 
step in the play. In this way, simulation and virtual training 
environments have to be conceived. 
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